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 Preface 
This monograph is intended to serve as a primer on the neoclassical theory of 
agricultural cooperatives.  Individuals with an understanding of fundamental eco-
nomic principles should be able to comprehend the material in this primer, which 
is presented verbally and graphically.  Mathematical models of both farm supply 
and marketing cooperatives are included in an appendix.  The material in the ap-
pendix should be appropriate for graduate students, advanced undergraduate stu-
dents, and others with elementary skills in calculus. 
This work was originally developed as a chapter for a planned revision of the 
textbook, Cooperatives in Agriculture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1989), edited by David W. Cobia.  Consequently, some of the material presented 
here reflects ideas contained in two chapters of that book written by the late Brian 
H. Schmiesing, formerly of South Dakota State University and Southwest Minne-
sota State University.  The author appreciates helpful comments by Joan Fulton, 
Claudia Parliament, and Richard Sexton in their reviews of an early draft. 
The material contained in this monograph was previously published as “The 
Neoclassical Theory of Cooperatives” in volume 28 (2014) of the Journal of Co-
operatives. 
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The Theory of Agricultural Cooperatives: 
A Neoclassical Primer 
Introduction 
This monograph provides an introduction to the neoclassical theory of cooper-
atives.  Theory is a tool economists use to study the behavior of economic agents 
such as consumers and firms.  An economic theory begins with assertions about 
behavior, such as consumers maximize utility or firms maximize profits.  Then a 
model, which is a simplified representation of reality, is constructed by specifying 
a set of assumptions about how the elements of the theory relate to the real world.  
By using models, economists reduce the complexities of the real world so they 
can focus on understanding essential economic relationships.  Utilizing logical 
arguments of deduction or mathematical techniques, economists derive conclu-
sions or predictions about economic behavior from a model. 
The neoclassical approach to theory is the one economists use most often.  In 
neoclassical economics, the value of products and the allocation of resources are 
determined by the costs of production and the tastes and preferences of consum-
ers.  Neoclassical theory relies on marginal analysis, in which the quantity of a 
product that is purchased or sold is based on the additional utility, revenue, or cost 
associated with the last unit. 
The neoclassical theory of the firm found in most economic textbooks is inad-
equate for understanding the economic behavior of cooperatives because asser-
tions about cooperative behavior are generally quite different than those for inves-
tor-owned firms (IOFs).  For example, the standard theory of the firm begins with 
the assertion that firms maximize profits.  This assertion is usually rejected by co-
operative theorists, who have ascribed other objectives to cooperatives, including 
maximization of member returns, maximization of patronage refunds, and mini-
mization of costs.  Each of these objectives requires a separate analysis, and con-
clusions about IOF behavior, based on profit maximization, do not necessarily 
apply to cooperatives. 
The theory presented here uses the neoclassical approach, including marginal 
analysis, to derive conclusions about the economic behavior of cooperatives.  The 
neoclassical theory of cooperatives is useful because it generates valuable insights 
into the expected behavior of cooperatives in various market structures and the 
differences between the behavior of cooperatives and IOFs.  Because the theoreti-
cal analysis of cooperatives can be based on several different assertions about co-
operative objectives, it also sheds light on the economic implications of a cooper-
ative’s choice of objectives and aids in the development of business strategies for 
cooperatives that are consistent with their objectives.  In addition, cooperative 
theory yields some important implications for public policy based on the expected 
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effects of cooperatives on economic welfare, including their effects on the per-
formance of other firms in imperfect markets. 
Although most of the neoclassical theory of cooperatives has been developed 
in the context of marketing cooperatives, we will first focus our attention on the 
theory of farm supply cooperatives.  That theory is less complex than the theory 
of marketing cooperatives, and the concepts used in the theory of farm supply co-
operatives will be more familiar to individuals with knowledge of the standard 
theory of the firm.  Later, we will build on the theory of farm supply cooperatives 
in developing the theory of marketing cooperatives.  Following that model, there 
is a discussion of the effects of cooperatives on economic welfare and the perfor-
mance of imperfect markets. 
Not all theoretical analyses of cooperatives have been conducted using the ne-
oclassical approach.  Game theory, which is used to study strategic decision mak-
ing, and a variety of other theoretical methods—such as transaction cost econom-
ics, agency theory, and property rights economics—that may be conveniently la-
beled “new institutional economics” have been used to provide additional insights 
into cooperative behavior and address shortcomings in the neoclassical theory.  
Both game theory and new institutional economics are beyond the purpose and 
scope of this monograph. 
Theory of Farm Supply Cooperatives 
Farm supply cooperatives are cooperatives that supply members with inputs 
they use in farm production.  Farm supply cooperatives may manufacture these 
inputs or purchase them from other firms.  For simplicity, we assume the coopera-
tive in our model supplies a single input to farmers.  We also assume the coopera-
tive produces the input it sells to its members.  The model can be extended to a 
cooperative that purchases the input from another firm by considering the produc-
tion costs as consisting of the costs of acquiring, transporting, and merchandizing 
the input. 
Roles of the Manager, Board of Directors, and Members 
Although most economic analyses of the firm are based on the assertion that 
firms maximize profits, there is no clear consensus about the objective of coop-
eratives.  Indeed, while the standard theory of the firm is based on the existence of 
an entrepreneur who makes decisions about the allocation of capital, labor, and 
other factors of production in the creation of profits, there has been disagreement 
about who the decision maker is in a cooperative.  Some early analyses of cooper-
atives, such as those by Emelianoff (1942) and Phillips (1953), did not 
acknowledge that entrepreneurial decisions were made by cooperatives.  Instead, 
Phillips assigned the decision-making role to the cooperative’s members, who in-
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dividually allocated their resources between their farming operations and the co-
operative. 
In 1962, Helmberger and Hoos presented a model of a marketing cooperative 
in which the cooperative was given a decision-making role and the objective of 
maximizing the price it paid its members for the raw product.  Helmberger and 
Hoos did not specify whether it was management or the board of directors that 
played this decision-making role.  Instead, they assumed the existence of a “peak 
coordinator,” consisting of an individual or group of individuals who wielded ef-
fective control over the organization.  The peak coordinator was not necessarily 
associated with the manager or the board of directors, but rather with the individ-
ual or group that specified the cooperative’s objective and engaged in strategies to 
attain it. 
Since Helmberger and Hoos, neoclassical models of cooperatives generally 
have assigned the decision-making role to the cooperative, although not address-
ing the issue of whether management or the board of directors was in control.  
Some of those models have been based in part on the Helmberger and Hoos mod-
el, and they have assumed the objective of maximizing the raw product price paid 
members.  However, several other cooperative objectives also have been used or 
discussed. 
More recently, in some theoretical work on cooperatives, there has been a re-
newed focus on the role of individual members as decision makers.  In those 
models, cooperatives are treated as coalitions of members with different and fre-
quently conflicting interests.  Within that framework, game theory has been used 
to analyze the internal decision-making processes of cooperatives by examining 
the strategies members and managers use to achieve their goals.1 
Possible Cooperative Objectives 
Because cooperatives are complex business organizations that serve a wide 
variety of purposes and perform a wide variety of functions, there is no single ob-
jective, like maximizing profits, that is generally accepted by all managers, boards 
of directors, and members.  Furthermore, because an individual cooperative may 
represent different and conflicting interests of its membership and management, 
there may be substantial disagreement within a cooperative about which objec-
tives it should pursue. 
A cooperative may pursue several objectives at the same time.  For example, a 
cooperative may attempt to earn a certain level of net income, maximize operating 
efficiency, maintain and expand its facilities, and increase its sales volume.  How-
                                                 
1 Cooperative theory has evolved over several decades, and a thorough review of its development 
is beyond the scope of this monograph.  See Staatz (1987 or 1989) for excellent surveys of this 
topic. 
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ever, these objectives can all be interpreted as strategies a cooperative might fol-
low in pursuing a single, broader long-term objective such as maximizing member 
returns. 
Because the analytical techniques used in neoclassical economic theory usual-
ly work best when a single objective is specified, we will follow that approach 
here.  However, we will examine several alternative objectives that seem plausi-
ble given the principles of cooperation, the objectives of cooperative members, 
and the competitive environment in which cooperatives operate.2  As we will see, 
the output and pricing decisions of a cooperative will often differ depending on 
which objective is pursued. 
One possible objective for a cooperative is to maximize its net earnings in the 
same manner an IOF maximizes profits.  Several reasons have been offered for 
why cooperatives might seek to maximize net earnings or profits.  By pursuing 
this objective, a cooperative will maximize funds available for paying patronage 
refunds or internally financing growth, and it can avoid hostility and retaliatory 
pricing by rival firms (Enke 1945, pp. 149–50).  Maximization of net earnings 
also may result in higher measures of financial performance.  To the extent that 
cooperative managers, boards of directors, and members use financial standards 
based on profit maximization, the pursuit of other objectives may result in poorer 
comparisons.  It is also possible that profit maximization may become part of a 
cooperative’s corporate culture through hiring managers from IOFs or because it 
is the objective cooperative directors pursue in their individual farming opera-
tions. 
Other possible objectives may stem from recognition of the concept that the 
purpose of a cooperative is to operate, not for its own economic gain, but for the 
benefit of its members.  Two objectives that members might consider appealing 
and consistent with this concept are maximization of the per-unit patronage re-
fund and minimization of the net price paid by members.  The first of these might 
at first appear to be an obvious goal for a cooperative.  However, minimization of 
the net price paid by members may be a more attractive objective because it takes 
into consideration the value of both the patronage refund and the cash price.  This 
objective may be particularly appealing to members whose decisions to purchase 
farm inputs from the cooperative are based on comparison of the prices charged 
by the cooperative and competing firms. 
Another objective consistent with the purpose of a cooperative is maximiza-
tion of member returns, which consist of the total profits of the individual mem-
bers, including the net earnings of the cooperative, which are distributed to mem-
                                                 
2 Many possible objectives have been suggested for cooperatives.  This section considers only five 
objectives, those analyzed by LeVay (1983a).  For a more thorough discussion of cooperative ob-
jectives, see Bateman, Edwards, and LeVay (1979). 
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bers as patronage refunds.  Support for this objective has been offered by Ladd 
(1982), LeVay (1983a), and Sexton (1984).  The objective is consistent with the 
profit-maximizing behavior ascribed to producers in most neoclassical models, 
and it would seem to be a more effective means of enhancing the benefits mem-
bers receive from the cooperative than focusing on a single indicator, such as the 
price of the farm input.  A disadvantage of the objective is it does not provide 
managers an easily measurable target, such as cooperative net earnings, the per-
unit patronage refund, or the net price. 
Finally, there are reasons why a cooperative might seek to maximize the quan-
tity of the farm input it produces.  Managers, boards of directors, and members 
may be inclined to judge the cooperative’s success in terms of its size and growth.  
In fact, in some cases management salaries may be linked to sales or turnover.  A 
cooperative also may want to maximize output to achieve economies of scale, re-
duce excess capacity, or increase its market share. 
Profit-Maximizing (IOF) Farm Supply Firm 
To compare the behavior of a farm supply cooperative to that of an IOF, we 
must first briefly review the standard theory of the firm.  Assume the IOF is a 
profit-maximizing firm that sells a single farm input to farmers in a perfectly 
competitive market.  In other words, the firm competes with a large number of 
other firms.  Therefore, its market share is so small it cannot affect the price it re-
ceives for the input no matter how many units it sells. 
The IOF’s demand curve and cost curves are shown in figure 1.  Under perfect 
competition, the firm faces a horizontal demand curve, reflecting that the price the 
firm receives (P1) is constant regardless of the quantity it sells.  The cost curves 
represent the costs of manufacturing or procuring the farm input and selling it to 
farmers.  Average total cost (ATC) is simply the total cost of producing the input 
divided by the number of units produced.  Marginal cost (MC) is the change in 
total cost due to producing one additional unit of the input.  The average total cost 
curve shown in figure 1 is U-shaped, representing conventional ideas about costs.  
Average cost at first decreases over a range before increasing.  Marginal cost is 
assumed to be generally increasing, at least over the relevant range.  It intersects 
the minimum of the average cost curve from below.  As long as the marginal cost 
of producing the farm input is less than average cost, average cost is declining.  
However, once marginal cost is greater than average cost, the average cost curve 
is positively sloped. 
A profit-maximizing farm supply firm in a perfectly competitive market will 
produce the quantity of farm input Q1 for which marginal cost equals the market 
price.  As long as the marginal cost—the cost of producing an additional unit—is 
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Figure 1.  Profit maximization by a farm supply firm (IOF) given perfect 
competition 
 
less than the market price, as for quantities less than Q1, the firm can increase its 
profits by producing more of the input.  By producing Q1, the firm earns profits 
equal to the shaded area.  That area represents the difference between the firm’s 
total revenue (which is the market price P1 times the quantity Q1) and its total cost 
(which is the average total cost C1 times Q1). 
Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition 
Many markets for farm inputs are not perfectly competitive.  Farm supply 
firms often face downward-sloping demand curves.  Instead of selling whatever 
quantity they produce at a constant price set by the market, these firms must lower 
the price they charge to increase sales.  The flexibility a firm facing a downward-
sloping demand curve has in setting its price provides it market power, i.e., the 
ability to raise its price to a level greater than its marginal cost. 
A firm may face a downward-sloping demand curve if it is a monopoly, i.e., it 
is the only supplier of the farm input in the market.  It also may face a downward-
sloping demand curve if the market is characterized by monopolistic competition.  
Under monopolistic competition, there is competition from other sellers, but each 
Jeffrey S. Royer 7 
 
 
firm faces a downward-sloping individual demand curve and has some market 
power. 
In markets for farm inputs, downward-sloping demand curves frequently re-
sult from the spatial distribution of competing firms.  If a farm supply firm sets a 
high price, it may sell only to farmers located nearby.  At lower prices, the firm 
may attract additional sales from farmers who are farther away and relatively 
closer to competing suppliers.  Downward-sloping demand curves also may be 
due in part to customer loyalty or product differentiation.  Farm supply firms use 
various means to differentiate their products from those of competitors, including 
advertising, brand creation, and the provision of credit or delivery and application 
services.3 
A profit-maximizing farm supply firm facing a downward-sloping demand 
curve is illustrated in figure 2.  Because the demand curve (D) represents the 
quantity that would be demanded at each price, it also represents the firm’s aver-
age revenue (AR).  The marginal revenue curve (MR) extends beneath the demand 
curve.  Marginal revenue is the added revenue the firm receives from each addi-
tional unit of sales.  When the demand curve facing a firm is downward sloping, 
the marginal revenue curve lies beneath the demand curve because the price of all 
units must be lowered to sell an additional unit. 
The slope of the demand curve depends on the availability of close substitutes 
for the product.  If the input supplier is a monopoly, the demand curve will be 
steeper than under monopolistic competition.  The introduction of similar prod-
ucts by firms competing in the same market would flatten a firm’s demand curve.  
At the extreme, if there were many firms offering perfect substitutes, the market 
would be characterized by perfect competition.  Then the firm’s demand curve 
would be horizontal, as in figure 1, and it would represent both the firm’s average 
revenue and its marginal revenue. 
A profit-maximizing farm supply firm facing a downward-sloping demand 
curve will produce the quantity of farm input for which marginal cost equals mar-
ginal revenue, represented by Q2 in figure 2.  As long as marginal cost is less than 
marginal revenue, as for quantities less than Q2, the firm can increase its profits 
by producing additional units.  At Q2, the firm’s profits equal the shaded area, 
which represents the difference between the firm’s total revenue P2 × Q2 and its 
total cost C2 × Q2. 
 
                                                 
3 When there is an oligopoly, i.e., several firms selling the same product, each firm will face a 
downward-sloping individual demand curve.  If one firm lowers its price or increases its output, 
the other firms in the market can be expected to react by adjusting their prices or output.  The var-
ious models used to explain and predict the behavior of an oligopolistic market are beyond this 
monograph’s purpose and scope. 
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Figure 2.  Profit maximization by a farm supply firm (IOF) given a down-
ward-sloping demand curve 
 
Price and Output Solutions for Cooperative Objectives 
The price and output solutions for four cooperative objectives commonly con-
sidered by cooperative theorists are illustrated in figure 3 for cases in which the 
cooperative faces a downward-sloping demand curve.  For convenience, these so-
lutions are summarized in table 1.  In these examples, we assume the cooperative 
sells the farm input only to its members so the demand curve facing the coopera-
tive represents the demand of its members for the input.  However, we also as-
sume members are free to purchase the input from other farm supply firms. 
If the cooperative maximizes its net earnings, it will produce at level Q1, 
which is determined by the intersection of its marginal revenue and marginal cost 
curves (MR = MC).  The price, which is read from the demand curve, is P1, and 
the average total cost is C1.  The net earnings of the cooperative are (P1 − C1) × 
Q1.  Assuming the cooperative returns all net earnings to members as patronage 
refunds, the per-unit patronage refund is P1 − C1 and the net price paid by mem-
bers is C1. 
Jeffrey S. Royer 9 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Price and output solutions for a farm supply cooperative under 
various objectives given a downward-sloping demand curve 
 
Minimization of the net price occurs at quantity Q2, which corresponds to the 
minimum of the average total cost curve—the point at which average total cost is 
intersected by marginal cost (MC = ATC).  The cash price P2 is relatively high 
compared to the other solutions.  However, after deducting the per-unit patronage 
refund P2 – C2, the net price is C2, which represents the lowest possible cost at 
which the input can be produced. 
Maximization of member returns occurs at Q3, determined by the intersection 
of the demand and marginal cost curves (AR = MC).  The cooperative’s net earn-
ings (P3 – C3) × Q3 are less than when the cooperative’s objective is maximization 
of net earnings.  This is because member returns consist of two components—the 
cooperative’s net earnings, which are distributed to members as patronage re-
funds, and the consumer surplus members receive as consumers of the farm input. 
Consumer surplus is the difference between what consumers individually 
would be willing to pay for a product, as indicated along the demand curve, and 
what they actually pay when a single market price is charged for all units.  In ef-
fect, consumer surplus consists of what consumers save because there is a single 
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Table 1.  Price and output solutions for a farm supply cooperative under var-
ious objectives 
 
market price.  Graphically, it is equal to the area below the demand curve and 
above the market price.  In the current context, consumer surplus is represented 
by the triangular area below the demand curve D and above the price P3.  That 
area, plus the cooperative’s net earnings (P3 – C3) × Q3, constitutes the member 
returns attributable to the cooperative’s sales of the farm input.  Maximum mem-
ber returns are represented by the shaded area. 
Maximization of the quantity of the farm input produced by the cooperative 
occurs at Q4, determined by the intersection of the demand and average total cost 
curves (AR = ATC).  Both the price and average cost are P4.  Thus both the coop-
erative’s net earnings and the per-unit patronage refund are zero.  Accordingly, 
this solution is often called the “breakeven” solution.  Production of quantities 
greater than Q4, although technically possible, would result in losses for the coop-
erative. 
If the cooperative sells the farm input in a perfectly competitive market, the 
solutions for maximization of net earnings and maximization of member returns 
are identical, as shown in figure 4.  Under perfect competition, the cooperative is 
a price taker, and the price it receives for the input is constant regardless of the 
quantity it sells. The price dictated by the demand curve represents both the coop-
erative’s average revenue and marginal revenue.  Consequently, the criterion for 
maximization of net earnings (MR = MC) is the same as for maximization of 
member returns (AR = MC).  In other words, the cooperative can ensure member 
returns are maximized simply by setting the quantity it produces to maximize its 
own net earnings, in the same manner as an IOF would maximize profits.  In fig-
ure 4, that quantity is Q1, and the average cost of producing the farm input is C1. 
 
Objective Criterion Quantity Price 
Patronage 
refund 
Net price 
Maximization of coopera-
tive net earnings 
MR = MC Q1 P1 P1 – C1 C1 
Minimization of net price MC = ATC Q2 P2 P2 – C2 C2 
Maximization of member 
returns (including patron-
age refunds) 
AR = MC Q3 P3 P3 – C3 C3 
Maximization of quantity AR = ATC Q4 P4 0 P4 
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Figure 4.  Price and output solutions for a farm supply cooperative under 
various objectives given perfect competition 
 
The cooperative’s net earnings are (P − C1) × Q1, and the per-unit patronage re-
fund is P − C1. 
Minimization of the net price occurs at the quantity corresponding to the min-
imum of the average total cost curve regardless of the slope of the demand curve.  
Thus under perfect competition, the net price is once again minimized at Q2, 
which corresponds to the intersection of the marginal cost and average total cost 
curves (MC = ATC).  At Q2, average cost is C2.  The cooperative’s net earnings 
are (P − C2) × Q2, and the per-unit patronage refund is P − C2. 
If the cooperative maximizes the quantity of the farm input it produces, output 
is again determined by the intersection of the demand and average total cost 
curves (AR = ATC).  Quantity is Q4, and both the price and average cost are P.  
Consequently, both the cooperative’s net earnings and the per-unit patronage re-
fund are zero. 
Stability of Cooperative Price and Output Solutions 
An important issue concerns the stability of the cooperative price and output 
solutions.  In all solutions, except for the one corresponding to the maximization 
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of quantity, members receive a patronage refund.  If they recognize the refund 
when making their purchasing decisions, they will have an incentive to expand 
their use of the farm input beyond the level associated with the cooperative’s ob-
jective.  Thus the output solutions associated with objectives other than maximi-
zation of quantity may not represent equilibrium solutions because they are unsta-
ble.  Purchases of the input will continue to expand until they reach Q4 in figure 3.  
At that level, which corresponds to the intersection of the demand and average 
total cost curves, the price of the farm input equals the average cost of producing 
it.  The patronage refund is zero, so members no longer have an incentive to in-
crease their purchases.  Thus this solution represents an equilibrium, unlike the 
others. 
The instability of the other solutions has important implications for coopera-
tives that pursue those objectives.  Because the receipt of patronage refunds pro-
vides members an incentive to expand their use of the input beyond the optimal 
level, a cooperative may not be able to achieve another objective unless it imposes 
some sort of restriction on the purchase of the farm input.  However, restrictions, 
such as quotas on purchases from the cooperative, could create member relations 
problems and contribute to erosion in customer loyalty over time. 
The significance of this problem will depend on the extent to which members 
take patronage refunds into consideration when making purchasing decisions.  It 
has been argued that members may not expect to receive patronage refunds when 
purchasing farm supplies or may consider the effective after-tax present value of 
cash and noncash patronage refund distributions to be zero.  If so, the price and 
output solutions associated with other objectives may be stable.  In addition, some 
research (Royer and Smith 2007) suggests that cooperatives may be able to use 
pricing strategies to achieve and maintain output levels consistent with other ob-
jectives. 
Strategies for Reducing Costs 
Cooperatives must develop business strategies consistent with their objectives 
to successfully adapt to changing market conditions.  For example, a cooperative 
that seeks to minimize the net price its members must pay for the farm input may 
find it can reduce the average cost of producing the input by shifting the demand 
curve or its cost curves.  Consider the cooperative represented by the cost curves 
ATC1 and MC1 in figure 5.  So we can focus on costs, assume the cooperative 
charges a price for the farm input just sufficient to cover its costs.  Thus if the co-
operative faces the demand curve D1, it will produce Q1 units of the input and 
charge a price equal to the average total cost C1.  As the figure shows, C1 repre-
sents a relatively high average cost compared to other points on ATC1.  Therefore, 
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Figure 5.  Strategies for reducing average total cost 
 
the cooperative might consider moving to another point on the curve to reduce its 
average cost. 
One strategy might be for the cooperative to lower the demand it faces for the 
input.  Assume the cooperative currently serves both member and nonmember 
patrons.  For example, the cooperative might sell fertilizer for use both on farms 
and on residential lawns and gardens.  The cooperative could discontinue sales to 
nonmembers, shifting the demand curve it faces from D1 to D2.  The new demand 
curve intersects the cooperative’s average total cost curve at the minimum.  By 
reducing the quantity it produces from Q1 to Q2, the cooperative can lower its av-
erage cost from C1 to C2.  Thus as a result of discontinuing service to nonmem-
bers, the cooperative is able to lower the cost of providing the input to members. 
In this example, the cooperative shifts its demand curve so it can operate at a 
different point on its short-run average total cost curve.4  In the short run, at least 
one of the cooperative’s factors of production is fixed.  In other words, we assume 
the plant the cooperative uses to produce the farm input is of a fixed capacity.  In 
the long run, all factors of production can be varied.  Consequently, an alternative 
                                                 
4 All curves depicted in the figures are for the short run unless otherwise indicated. 
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long-run strategy might be for the cooperative to move along its long-run average 
cost curve by constructing a larger manufacturing plant or expanding the capacity 
of its existing plant. 
Assume the cooperative continues to sell the farm input to nonmembers, so its 
demand curve remains D1.  By building a new plant, represented by the cost 
curves ATC2 and MC2, the cooperative can operate on the long-run average total 
cost curve (LRAC) where it is intersected by the demand curve.  The cooperative 
will produce Q3 units of the farm input at an average cost of C3, which is lower 
than either C1 or C2. 
In other situations, the problem may be that the cooperative is underutilizing 
its existing plant capacity.  Assume the cooperative’s manufacturing plant is once 
again represented by the cost curves ATC1 and MC1 but the demand curve is D3.  
The cooperative produces Q4 units of the input at an average cost of C4.  Increas-
ing production to Q2 would lower the average cost from C4 to C2 at the minimum 
of ATC1.  The difference between Q2 and Q4 is referred to as excess capacity—the 
cooperative’s existing plant is too large relative to its use.  Because the coopera-
tive is using only a small proportion of its existing plant’s capacity, those units of 
the farm input that are produced must cover a disproportionately large share of the 
plant’s fixed costs.  The cooperative would be able to lower its average cost by 
either decreasing its plant size or increasing the demand for its production. 
Neighboring cooperatives might consider merger as a means of reducing ex-
cess capacity and achieving economies of scale.  Consider two cooperatives, each 
of which operates a propane delivery truck at 40 percent capacity.  By merging 
their propane operations, the cooperatives might be able to eliminate one of the 
trucks, as well as some excess propane storage capacity, and reduce labor expens-
es.  Cooperatives also might consider increasing the demand for their products by 
promoting sales to nonmembers. 
Long-Run Equilibria for Various Objectives 
In the long run, a firm can vary its capacity by expanding or reducing the size 
of its manufacturing plant or by building a new plant.  Similarly, new firms can 
enter the industry or existing firms can exit.  In addition, the demand curve for the 
cooperative’s production can shift, and its costs can change over time. 
If the industry is perfectly competitive, there are no barriers to entry and the 
existence of excess profits—profits in excess of the normal return on capital in-
cluded in average total cost—will attract new firms into the industry.  The entry 
of those firms will shift the market supply curve for the farm input to the right, 
and the market price will fall.  This process will continue until price equals mini-
mum long-run average cost.  At that point, profits are zero and the firms in the 
 
Jeffrey S. Royer 15 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Long-run equilibria for IOFs and cooperatives given perfect com-
petition 
 
industry will receive only a normal return equal to the opportunity costs of the 
factors of production they employ. 
Figure 6 represents the long-run equilibrium for a profit-maximizing IOF.  
The equilibrium market price is P, and the demand curve facing the firm is tan-
gent to the firm’s long-run average cost curve (LRAC) at quantity Q1.  For the 
minimum of the long-run average cost curve to occur at Q1, so must the minimum 
of the short-run average cost curve (ATC).  Thus LRAC, ATC, LRMC (long-run 
marginal cost), and MC (short-run marginal cost) all are equal to the market price 
P at Q1.  Moreover, P is equivalent to AR (average revenue) and MR (marginal 
revenue) given the horizontal demand curve.  The market is in equilibrium be-
cause the condition for profit maximization (P = MC) is satisfied and there is no 
incentive for the entry or exit of firms when profits are zero (P = ATC). 
Price P and quantity Q1 would also represent the long-run equilibrium for a 
cooperative, regardless of its objective.  All cooperatives would operate at Q1 be-
cause the criteria for maximization of net earnings (MR = MC), minimization of 
net price (MC = ATC), maximization of member returns (AR = MC), and maximi-
zation of quantity (AR = ATC) all are satisfied at that level.  Thus under perfect 
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competition, the long-run equilibria for cooperatives are identical to that for a 
profit-maximizing IOF. 
A cooperative that is in a monopoly market will continue to face a downward-
sloping demand curve in the long run if there are barriers to the entry of new firms 
into the industry.  For convenience, assume figure 3 now reflects the long-run 
demand and costs facing the cooperative.5  Then the figure can be used to repre-
sent the long-run price and output solutions for the objectives listed in table 1.  
Given these conditions, the long-run price and output solutions for a cooperative 
will be identical to the short-run solutions already discussed. 
Under monopolistic competition, there are no barriers to entry, and in the long 
run the existence of excess profits provides an incentive for the entry of new firms 
into the industry.  According to standard theory, a firm will maximize its profits 
by producing at the level where its marginal revenue curve intersects its long-run 
marginal cost curve.  With additional entry, the demand curve facing the firm will 
shift to the left until it is tangent to the firm’s long-run average cost curve and its 
profits are driven to zero. 
This is illustrated in figure 7.  Assume the industry consists of profit-
maximizing IOFs with identical costs and market demand is distributed equally 
among all firms.  At long-run equilibrium, the demand curve facing each individ-
ual firm, which is labeled D, is tangent to the long-run average cost curve LRAC 
at Q1.  At that quantity, each firm’s marginal revenue curve MR intersects its 
long-run marginal cost curve LRMC.  The market price is P, and profits are zero 
because price is equal to average total cost.  Output is at equilibrium because 
there are no profits or losses in the industry.  Consequently, there is no incentive 
for entry or exit. 
Notice that because the demand curve facing the firm is downward sloping, 
the tangency between the demand curve and the long-run average cost curve must 
occur to the left of the cost curve’s minimum.  As a result, monopolistic competi-
tion among profit-maximizing firms is characterized by excess capacity.  In this 
example, the excess capacity is Q2 – Q1. 
We typically would not expect to observe farm input markets consisting of 
cooperatives engaged in monopolistic competition with one another.  More often 
we would expect a market in which there is a mix of IOFs and cooperatives.  To 
construct a model of such a market, we must make additional assumptions about 
the structure of the market and the behavior of the firms.  The results of the model 
will depend on the assumptions we make. 
 
                                                 
5 Long-run demand and cost curves generally are not as steep as their short-run counterparts be-
cause decisions made in the long run are more responsive to price changes given consumers and 
producers have additional choices and more time to adjust. 
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Figure 7.  Long-run equilibria for IOFs and cooperatives given monopolistic 
competition 
 
For example, consider an industry consisting of several IOFs and a single co-
operative.  Assume the market price is determined by competition among the 
IOFs and the cooperative is a price taker that can sell whatever quantity it chooses 
at that price.  Market demand, less the quantity sold by the cooperative, is distrib-
uted equally among the IOFs.  Then entry by new IOFs will continue until the 
demand curve facing each IOF is tangent to its long-run average cost curve, as at 
Q1 in figure 7.  The output of the cooperative will depend on its objective.  De-
pending on whether the cooperative minimizes net price, maximizes member re-
turns, or maximizes quantity, its output would be Q2, Q3, or Q4 respectively.  If its 
objective is maximization of net earnings, its output would be Q3, the same as for 
maximization of member returns.  Because we have assumed the cooperative is a 
price taker, its marginal revenue is the market price P instead of MR, the marginal 
revenue for the IOFs.  Regardless of its objective, the cooperative will produce a 
greater quantity of the farm input than an IOF, and in most cases its average cost 
will be lower. 
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Theory of Marketing Cooperatives 
Marketing cooperatives are cooperatives that market farm commodities pro-
duced by member farmers.  In some cases, a marketing cooperative simply pur-
chases a commodity from its members and resells it to food manufacturing or 
processing firms after providing some minimal services such as assembling and 
grading the commodity.  After the cooperative sells the commodity to a manufac-
turer or processor, it distributes any additional revenues, after deducting transpor-
tation or handling costs, to members as patronage refunds.  In other cases, the co-
operative may process the commodity and sell the processed product to consum-
ers or retailers.  In those cases, the patronage refunds include any value added to 
the commodity by the cooperative. 
Here we explore the general case of a processing cooperative that purchases a 
raw product from its members and uses the raw product to produce a processed 
product it sells to consumers.  For simplicity, we assume that one unit of the raw 
product is used to produce one unit of the processed product (i.e., the processor is 
subject to a form of fixed-proportions production technology).  The model can be 
applied to a cooperative that simply markets the raw product for its members by 
considering the processing costs as representing the costs of transporting or mar-
keting the raw product. 
Analyses of the price and output decisions of a processing firm frequently uti-
lize the net average revenue product and net marginal revenue product curves.  
Use of these curves is advantageous because it allows revenues and costs at the 
processing level to be combined, thereby facilitating the graphical exposition of 
the relationship between the processor and the producers of the raw product.  Der-
ivation of the net average revenue product and net marginal revenue product 
curves begins with the net revenue product, which is defined as the total revenue 
of the processor less the total cost of processing the raw product.  The cost of pro-
cessing the raw product used to compute the net revenue product does not include 
the cost of the raw product itself. 
Net average revenue product (NARP) is defined as net revenue product divid-
ed by the quantity of product and is equivalent to the price received by the proces-
sor less its average processing cost.  It represents the amount per unit that is avail-
able for raw product payment and profit.  Net marginal revenue product (NMRP) 
is defined as the change in net revenue product from processing an additional unit 
of raw product, and it is equivalent to marginal revenue less marginal processing 
cost. 
The relationship of the NARP and NMRP curves to processing costs and the 
demand for the processed product is illustrated in figure 8.  The average and mar-
ginal processing costs are represented by APC and MPC in the upper panel.  The 
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Figure 8.  Relationship of the NARP and NMRP curves to processing costs 
and processed product demand 
 
demand and marginal revenue curves for the processed product are represented by 
D and MR.  The NARP curve, which is shown in the lower panel, is derived by 
subtracting the APC curve from the demand curve, which represents the price (P) 
or average revenue (AR) for the processed product.  Quantities Q1 and Q4 corre-
spond to the intersections of the demand and APC curves.  Wherever the demand 
curve is above the APC curve (i.e., the price is greater than the average processing 
cost), the NARP curve is positive, as it is over the range from Q1 to Q4.  The max-
imum of the NARP curve corresponds to Q2, the quantity at which the distance 
between the demand and APC curves is greatest (i.e., where the slopes of the two 
curves are the same).  The NARP curve will have a downward-sloping portion if 
either the demand curve facing the cooperative is downward sloping or if the av-
erage processing cost is increasing, as might be expected in the short run. 
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Table 2.  Price and output solutions for a marketing cooperative under vari-
ous objectives 
 
The NMRP curve is derived by subtracting the MPC curve from the MR curve.  
It intersects the NARP curve through the NARP curve’s maximum and is positive 
as long as the MR curve is above the MPC curve (i.e., marginal revenue is greater 
than marginal processing cost).  The NMRP curve intersects the quantity axis at 
Q3, which is determined by the intersection of the MR and MPC curves. 
Price and Output Solutions for Marketing Cooperatives 
Table 2 presents four possible objectives for marketing cooperatives that are 
analogous to those discussed earlier for farm supply cooperatives.6  The price and 
output solutions for these objectives are illustrated in figure 9.  In the figure, the 
NARP and NMRP curves for a processing cooperative are shown with the raw 
product supply curve facing the cooperative (S).  The positive slope of the supply 
curve reflects that the cooperative cannot purchase whatever quantity of the raw 
 
                                                 
6 Empirical investigations on which objectives cooperatives choose to pursue have yielded mixed 
results.  In a study of California cotton ginning cooperatives, Sexton, Wilson, and Wann (1989) 
concluded that their data indicated that the cooperatives operated near the maximum of the NARP 
curve, a result consistent with the Helmberger and Hoos (1962) objective of maximizing the raw 
product price for whatever quantity members choose to supply.  Featherstone and Rahman (1996) 
conducted a study of Midwestern farm supply and marketing cooperatives in which they conclud-
ed that there was strong support for the minimization of average costs and little support for profit 
maximization as the objective of the cooperatives.  More recently, Boyle (2004), in a study of Irish 
dairy processing cooperatives, concluded that the rule those cooperatives used to price milk was 
based on the NMRP curve rather than the NARP curve, a finding consistent with an objective of 
maximizing either processor or producer profits. 
Objective Criterion Quantity Price 
Patronage 
refund 
Net price 
Maximization of coopera-
tive net earnings 
NMRP = MFC Q1 R1 N1 – R1 N1 
Maximization of net price NMRP = NARP Q2 R2 N2 – R2 N2 
Maximization of member 
returns (including patron-
age refunds) 
NMRP = S Q3 R3 N3 – R3 N3 
Maximization of quantity NARP = S Q4 R4 0 R4 
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Figure 9.  Price and output solutions for a marketing cooperative under 
various objectives 
 
product it chooses at a constant market price.  Instead, it must raise the price it 
pays for the raw product to increase its purchases. 
A firm may face an upward-sloping supply curve if it is a monopsony, i.e., it is 
the only processor in the market.  In that case, the supply curve facing the firm 
may be the result of the increasing marginal costs faced by producers.  A firm also 
may face an upward-sloping supply curve if the market is characterized by mo-
nopsonistic competition.  Under monopsonistic competition, there is competition 
from other processors but each firm has some market power.  In those cases, the 
upward-sloping raw product supply curve facing each processor results in part 
from the spatial distribution of the processors.  If a processor sets a low price for 
the raw product it purchases, it may receive deliveries only from nearby produc-
ers.  At higher prices, it may attract additional deliveries from producers who are 
farther away and relatively closer to competing processors. 
The marginal factor cost curve represents how much each additional unit of 
the raw product will cost the processor as it increases the quantity it purchases.  If 
a processor faces an upward-sloping supply curve, as in figure 9, the marginal 
factor cost curve will lie above the supply curve because to purchase an additional 
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unit of the raw product, the processor must pay a higher price for the other units it 
purchases. 
Like a farm supply cooperative, a marketing cooperative may choose to max-
imize its net earnings in a manner similar to an IOF.  To do so, it would set the 
price it pays for the raw product at R1 and process Q1 units, the quantity that cor-
responds to the intersection of the NMRP and MFC curves.  The cooperative’s net 
earnings would be (N1 − R1) × Q1 where N1 represents the value of NARP at Q1.  
Those earnings would be distributed to members in the form of patronage refunds 
by setting the per-unit patronage refund to N1 − R1.  Adding the per-unit refund to 
the cash price, the net price paid members would be N1. 
A cooperative that seeks to maximize the net price it pays members would 
process quantity Q2, which corresponds to the maximum of the NARP curve—the 
point at which the NARP curve is intersected by the NMRP curve.  The cash price 
would be R2, which is relatively low compared to the other solutions.  However, 
after adding the per-unit patronage refund N2 – R2, the net price is N2, which rep-
resents the maximum price that can be paid. 
Maximization of member returns, including the earnings of the cooperative, 
occurs at Q3, determined by the intersection of the NMRP and supply curves.  The 
cooperative would pay members a cash price of R3.  The net earnings of the coop-
erative, which are returned to members as patronage refunds, would be (N3 – R3) 
× Q3.  Although these earnings are less than when the cooperative’s objective is 
maximization of net earnings, total member returns are greater than for any other 
solution. 
Member returns consist of two components—the cooperative’s net earnings, 
which are distributed to members as patronage refunds, and the on-farm profits 
members earn from producing the raw product.  The on-farm profits cannot be 
shown directly in figure 9.  However, the figure can be used to illustrate the max-
imization of member returns if we focus on the producer surplus of members in-
stead of their on-farm profits.  As we will see, maximizing the sum of the cooper-
ative’s net earnings and producer surplus is equivalent to maximizing member 
returns. 
Producer surplus is the difference between what producers individually must 
receive to be willing to produce the product, as indicated along the supply curve, 
and what they actually receive when a single market price is paid for all units.  In 
effect, producer surplus consists of what producers gain because there is a single 
market price.  Graphically, it is equal to the area above the supply curve and be-
low the market price. 
In figure 9, producer surplus is represented by the triangular area above the 
supply curve S and below the raw product price R3.  The area R3 × Q3 represents 
the revenues producers receive from sale of the raw product.  If we assume the 
supply curve represents the marginal cost of producing the raw product, the trian-
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gular area below the supply curve represents the total variable cost of production.7  
Thus the triangular area above the supply curve represents producers’ on-farm 
profits and fixed costs. 
Because fixed costs are constant with respect to changes in quantity, maximi-
zation of the cooperative’s net earnings and producer surplus is equivalent to 
maximization of member returns—the sum of the cooperative’s net earnings and 
the on-farm profits of members.  Both are maximized at Q3.  Maximum member 
returns from the cooperative purchasing and processing the raw product are repre-
sented by the shaded area in figure 9, which consists of the rectangular area (N3 – 
R3) × Q3 that represents the cooperative’s net earnings and the triangular area 
above the supply curve that represents producer surplus. 
The quantity of raw product processed by the cooperative is maximized at Q4, 
determined by the intersection of the NARP and supply curves.  As in the case of 
a farm supply cooperative, the maximization of output may represent the only 
equilibrium solution.  In the solutions for the other three objectives listed in table 
2, members will have an incentive to increase their deliveries to the cooperative if 
they take patronage refunds into account in making their marketing decisions.  
The supply of the raw product will increase until it reaches Q4.  At that level, the 
price of the processed product equals the sum of the raw product price and the 
per-unit cost of processing the raw product.  The patronage refund is zero, so 
members no longer have an incentive to increase supply.  A cooperative that pur-
sues an objective other than the maximization of quantity may need to resort to a 
nonprice instrument such as delivery or supply quotas to restrict output.8 
Strategies for Raising the Raw Product Price 
Just as farm supply cooperatives may be interested in strategies for reducing 
the cost of providing a farm input to members, marketing cooperatives may be 
interested in ways they can raise the price they pay members for the raw product.  
So we can focus on the raw product price, assume the cooperative sets the price 
equal to NARP.  In other words, it pays a raw product price equal to the difference 
between the processed product price and the average processing cost so it just co-
vers its costs. 
 
                                                 
7 Transportation costs can be included in variable costs when there is a spatial dimension to the 
raw product market.  Because average transportation costs can be expected to rise as the distance 
between the processor and producers increases, the supply curve will have a steeper slope. 
 
8 Lopez and Spreen (1985) have also referred to processing rights, penalty schemes, and allocating 
cooperative earnings to members according a criterion unrelated to patronage.  Sexton, Wilson, 
and Wann (1989) have mentioned multipart pricing schemes. 
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Figure 10.  Strategies for raising the raw product price 
 
Consider the marketing cooperative represented in figure 10.  Assume the raw 
product supply curve facing the cooperative is S1.  The cooperative would process 
Q1 units of the raw product and pay members a net price of R1.  A cooperative 
such as this, which is operating along the upward-sloping portion of its NARP 
curve, might benefit from shifting the supply curve to the right.  For example, if 
this cooperative could shift the supply curve it faces to S2, where it intersects the 
NARP curve at the maximum, the cooperative would be able to raise the net price 
to R2.  It might be able to accomplish this by accepting new members or encour-
aging existing members to expand their production. 
A cooperative that is operating along the downward-sloping portion of its 
NARP curve may be able to raise the raw product price it pays by shifting the 
supply curve to the left.  Assume the supply curve facing the cooperative is S3.  If 
the cooperative could shift the supply curve from S3 to S2, it would be able to raise 
the net price from R3 to R2.  It might be able to accomplish this by implementing 
delivery quotas or some other nonprice instrument. 
Another way a cooperative might be able to increase the price it pays mem-
bers is to adjust the capacity of its processing plant in the same manner as a farm 
supply cooperative might adjust the capacity of the plant it uses to manufacture a 
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farm input.  Remember that the NARP curve is derived by subtracting average 
processing cost from the processed product price.  Consequently, if the coopera-
tive can lower its processing costs by building a new processing plant or adjusting 
the size of its existing plant, it can shift its NARP curve upward, thereby increas-
ing the price it is able to pay. 
Open- and Restricted-Membership Cooperatives 
To avoid operating along the downward-sloping portion of its NARP curve, a 
cooperative might adopt a restricted-membership policy (also called a closed-
membership policy).  Under a restricted-membership policy, a cooperative limits 
its membership so it can maximize the raw product price it pays current members.  
Under an open-membership policy, a cooperative accepts any producer who ap-
plies for membership.  As a consequence, it may not be able to limit raw product 
deliveries. 
Assume the raw product supplied by all producers in a cooperative’s trade ar-
ea is represented by the supply curve S3 in figure 10.  A restricted-membership 
cooperative would fix its membership so the member supply curve is S2.  Conse-
quently, it would process Q2 units and pay its members a price of R2.  If the coop-
erative were to follow an open-membership policy, member supply might eventu-
ally shift to S3, expanding the raw product processed by the cooperative to Q3.  As 
a result, the raw product price would fall to R3. 
Note that if the cooperative were operating along the upward-sloping portion 
of its NARP curve, it might choose to accept new members so it could shift the 
raw product supply curve to the right.  Some marketing cooperatives have alter-
nately adopted open- and restricted-membership policies to balance member sup-
ply with changing market conditions over time. 
Long-Run Equilibria for Marketing Cooperatives 
In the long run, a processor may be able to increase its profits or improve its 
efficiency by adjusting the scale of its processing plant.  Meanwhile, the raw 
product supply curve and the processed product demand curve facing the proces-
sor can shift, and its costs can change over time. 
Figure 11 shows a processor’s long-run NARP and NMRP curves as well as 
the long-run supply (S1) and marginal factor cost (MFC1) curves it faces.  At first, 
assume there are barriers to entry to prevent new processors from entering the 
market.  In other words, the shape and position of the long-run supply curve are 
unaffected by the entry of other firms. 
An IOF that seeks to maximize profits (a monopsony) would set output so 
NMRP = MFC1.  It would pay producers a raw product price of RM and process 
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Figure 11.  Long-run equilibria for IOFs and cooperatives given barriers to 
entry 
 
QM units of output.  An open-membership cooperative with the same NARP and 
NMRP curves would process QO units, determined by the intersection of the sup-
ply and NARP curves.  The cooperative would pay members a price of RO.  Con-
sumers would benefit from greater output and a lower processed product price, 
and producers would benefit from a higher raw product price. 
The implications of a restricted-membership policy are much different.  A re-
stricted-membership cooperative would act to limit its membership so the supply 
curve it faces would intersect the NARP curve at the maximum, as S2 does.  The 
cooperative would process QR units and pay members a price of RR.  Although 
producers would benefit from a higher raw product price, consumers would be 
faced with reduced output and a higher processed product price.  In this case, the 
cooperative restricts output to a level even lower than the monopsony, a result 
first reported by Helmberger (1964). 
If there are no barriers to entry, the entry of new processors into the market 
could shift the supply curve facing an individual firm to the left as more firms 
compete for delivery of the raw product.  Ultimately, the supply curve could shift 
leftward until it is tangent to the NARP curve and processor profits are zero, an 
Jeffrey S. Royer 27 
 
 
outcome analogous to the long-run equilibrium for monopolistic competition de-
scribed earlier.  However, the costs of constructing new processing plants may 
present a barrier to entry, especially in markets that are sparse relative to the size 
of plant necessary for efficient operation.  As a result, many raw product markets 
may be characterized by monopsony instead of monopsonistic competition.  In-
deed, there have been numerous instances when agricultural producers have been 
forced to organize a cooperative to provide a market for their output after the exit 
of the area’s only processor. 
Effects of Cooperatives on Economic Welfare 
Public policy concerning cooperatives generally has been supportive.  Coop-
eratives have benefited from favorable treatment with respect to tax status, credit 
access, technical assistance, and limited immunity from antitrust laws.  This sup-
port is based largely on the notion that cooperatives are procompetitive forces that 
improve the performance of imperfect markets and increase general economic 
welfare. 
Economic welfare consists of the sum of the consumer surplus and producer 
surplus received by market participants.  It is maximized when the cost of produc-
ing the last unit of a product, as represented by the marginal cost, equals the value 
of that last unit to buyers, as represented by the market price.  A firm or market 
can be said to allocate resources efficiently if it uses them in such a way that eco-
nomic welfare is maximized. 
The benchmark for market comparisons is perfect competition because per-
fectly competitive firms are characterized by allocative efficiency in that they 
produce the quantity at which price equals marginal cost.  In analyzing coopera-
tive market performance, we will be interested in determining those cases in 
which cooperatives can be expected to behave in the same manner as perfectly 
competitive firms, i.e., the cooperatives are characterized by allocative efficiency.  
Even when cooperatives are not efficient in an allocative sense, they may be pre-
ferred to profit-maximizing firms if they create a greater level of economic wel-
fare. 
In figure 12, we compare the short-run price and output solutions for proces-
sors maximizing profits, member returns, and quantity to the welfare-maximizing 
solution.  To facilitate the comparison, we assume the raw product supply curve 
(S) represents the marginal cost to farmers of producing the raw product.  We also 
add a curve labeled P – MPC to the figure.  This curve represents the difference 
between the market price for the processed product and the marginal processing 
cost.  It is derived by subtracting marginal processing cost from D, the demand 
curve for the processed product as shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 12.  Comparison of three price and output solutions to the welfare-
maximizing solution 
 
Economic welfare is maximized when the processed product price equals the 
sum of the marginal production and processing costs, as at Q* in figure 12.  A 
profit-maximizing processor would set NMRP equal to MFC at Q1.  The firm 
would restrict output to less than Q* by acting as a monopoly in the processed 
product market and a monopsony in the raw product market.  More output would 
be socially desirable because the marginal cost of producing the last unit, which 
consists of the sum of the marginal cost of producing the raw product represented 
by S and the marginal processing cost MPC, would be less than its value to con-
sumers, as represented by the processed product price P.  The firm would produce 
the efficient level of output only if it were a price taker in both markets, i.e., both 
the processed product demand curve and the raw product supply curve were hori-
zontal. 
A cooperative that maximizes member returns would set NMRP equal to the 
marginal cost of producing the raw product.  The cooperative’s output Q3 would 
be greater than that of a profit-maximizing firm but less than the efficient level of 
output.  Like a profit-maximizing firm, it would act as a monopoly in the pro-
cessed product market if it faced a downward-sloping demand curve, but it would 
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behave like a perfectly competitive firm if it faced a horizontal demand curve.  
Regardless of the slope of the demand curve, the cooperative would act like a per-
fectly competitive firm in the raw product market because it returns its earnings to 
members.  Because marketing cooperatives are often price takers in the markets in 
which they sell, cooperatives that seek to maximize member returns can be ex-
pected to result in an efficient allocation of resources in those markets. 
A cooperative that maximizes quantity would generally overproduce relative 
to the efficient level.  It would produce Q4, the quantity at which NARP equals the 
marginal cost of producing the raw product.  Production exceeds what is socially 
desirable because the marginal cost of producing the last unit, i.e., the sum of the 
marginal cost of producing the raw product and the marginal processing cost, ex-
ceeds its value to consumers.  There is a misallocation of resources because the 
resources used in producing the last unit could have been used better in the pro-
duction of some other good.  The cooperative would produce the efficient level of 
output only if the marginal processing cost is equal to the average processing cost 
as it is at the minimum of the average processing cost curve or under a cost struc-
ture characterized by constant marginal processing costs. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for farm supply firms.  For a farm supply 
firm, welfare maximization requires that the firm produce the quantity of farm 
input for which price equals marginal cost.  A profit-maximizing firm would pro-
duce this quantity if it were a price taker.  However, if it faces a downward-
sloping demand curve, it would act like a monopoly by restricting output so mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost are equal.  Regardless of the slope of the demand 
curve, a cooperative that maximizes member returns will produce the efficient 
level of output by setting price equal to marginal cost.  It will not restrict output, 
as a monopoly would, when facing its members’ demand.  A cooperative that 
maximizes quantity generally will overproduce by operating where price equals 
average cost.  It will produce at the efficient level only if average cost equals 
marginal cost. 
Effects on Other Firms 
An important dimension of the economic performance of cooperatives con-
cerns the effects they can be expected to have on other firms in imperfect markets.  
According to the competitive yardstick concept, the presence of a cooperative in a 
market will force profit-maximizing firms to behave more competitively.  The 
logic behind the competitive yardstick is that the cooperative will offer farmers 
more favorable prices because of its practice of providing members service at 
cost.  Competing firms must match the cooperative’s price to avoid losing cus-
tomers to it.  Consequently, the market will move toward competitive equilibrium.  
Beneficiaries of the cooperative’s presence in the market include both its mem-
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bers, who receive service at cost, and farmers who continue to patronize other 
firms but receive a better price.  Consumers also benefit from greater output and a 
lower price. 
Helmberger (1964) contended that an important factor in determining the ex-
istence of the yardstick effect is the cooperative’s membership policy.  If faced 
with a downward-sloping demand curve or increasing average processing costs, 
only an open-membership cooperative could be expected to exert a positive effect 
on competition.  LeVay (1983b) challenged Helmberger’s conclusion by arguing 
that an open-membership cooperative will produce beyond the socially desirable 
level by accepting whatever quantity of raw product members choose to deliver.  
LeVay conceded that economic welfare still could be enhanced by the stimulating 
effect an open-membership cooperative would have on competing firms but in-
sisted that this role might also be filled by a cooperative that restricts output to 
maximize member returns. 
Cotterill (1997) has constructed a graphical presentation to describe how the 
competitive yardstick effect might work in a food processing industry.  In his 
model, farmers produce a raw product that is purchased by processing firms that 
process the product and sell it to consumers.  The processing industry is a duopo-
ly, i.e., it consists of two firms—an IOF and a cooperative in this case.  The firms 
compete in prices, and there are barriers to entry.  Both firms maximize profits, 
but the cooperative distributes its profits to members in proportion to patronage.  
The cooperative also maintains an open-membership policy, which is essential to 
the results. 
Members respond to the receipt of patronage refunds by increasing their out-
put of the raw product.  Thus the cooperative must sell a greater quantity of the 
processed product, and to do so, it must lower its price.  In response to the lower 
price, consumers switch to the cooperative, and the demand curve facing the IOF 
shifts to the left.  As a result, the IOF must lower its price as well.  Through this 
movement of prices, both firms tend toward equilibrium.  At equilibrium, the co-
operative’s price is just sufficient to cover its long-run average cost.  The IOF 
sells a smaller quantity at a higher price and still makes a profit.  However, its 
equilibrium price is lower than if the cooperative had been another IOF.9 
                                                 
9 Cotterill (1997) has also presented a model of how the competitive yardstick effect might work 
in a food processing industry characterized by monopolistic competition and consisting of several 
IOFs and a single cooperative.  In that model, both the IOFs and cooperative maximize profits.  
The firms may engage in either price or nonprice competition, but initially they are involved in 
nonprice competition through the creation of brands.  Again, the cooperative must lower its price 
to sell the greater output due to its members’ response to the receipt of patronage refunds.  Conse-
quently, the IOFs are forced to compete in price, and the inefficiency associated with excessive 
brand creation is eliminated. 
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Several other models, including that developed by Tennbakk (1995), have 
used a mathematical approach to show that in a duopoly consisting of profit-
maximizing firms, the replacement of one of the firms by a cooperative that max-
imizes member returns will result in greater industry output and economic wel-
fare.  However, those models are not based on the dynamics of the competitive 
yardstick model.  Instead, the profit-maximizing firm and the cooperative make 
their output decisions simultaneously.10 
Conclusions 
The development of the neoclassical theory of cooperatives represents an im-
portant step in understanding cooperatives because the standard theory of the firm 
is inadequate for analyzing these organizations given assertions about their behav-
ior are generally different than those for other firms.  Specifically, cooperative 
theorists usually have ascribed objectives other than profit maximization to coop-
eratives. 
The neoclassical theory of cooperatives has generated valuable insights into 
the expected behavior of cooperatives in various market structures and the differ-
ences between the behavior of cooperatives and IOFs.  An analysis of farm supply 
cooperatives suggests their price and output solutions may differ substantially 
from those of IOFs both in the short run and the long run, especially if the de-
mand curve is downward sloping.  Analysis of the short-run price and output solu-
tions for marketing cooperatives suggests they also may differ substantially from 
those of IOFs. 
The stability of the cooperative price and output solutions is an important is-
sue.  In the case of a farm supply cooperative, the receipt of patronage refunds 
provides members an incentive to expand their use of the farm input beyond the 
optimal level.  Thus the cooperative may not be able to pursue its objective with-
out imposing some sort of restriction on the purchase of the input.  The signifi-
cance of this problem depends on the extent to which members take patronage 
refunds into consideration when making purchasing decisions. 
Cooperatives must adopt business strategies to successfully adapt to changing 
market conditions.  Because they may have objectives other than profit maximiza-
tion, strategies used by IOFs may not be appropriate for them.  Neoclassical co-
operative theory has led to the development of strategies for cooperatives that are 
                                                 
10 The Tennbakk model consists of a Cournot duopoly in which both firms simultaneously set 
quantities while assuming the other firm will not vary its output in response.  The model also as-
sumes constant marginal costs and a downward-sloping linear demand curve.  The increase in out-
put associated with the replacement of one of the profit-maximizing firms with a cooperative is 
due to the cooperative’s output rather than an increase in the output of the remaining profit-
maximizing firm, which actually decreases. 
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consistent with their objectives.  Both short-run and long-run strategies for reduc-
ing the average cost of producing a farm input are described here.  Those strate-
gies, which consist of shifting either the demand curve or the cost curves for the 
input, are consistent with the cooperative objective of minimizing the price it 
charges members for the input.  Strategies for raising the raw product price a 
marketing cooperative pays members are also described here. 
In the long run, the quantity of raw product processed by a marketing coopera-
tive depends on its membership policy.  A cooperative with an open-membership 
policy may process a greater quantity than a profit-maximizing firm.  However, a 
cooperative with a restricted-membership policy may limit output to a level lower 
than a monopsony to pay members the highest possible raw product price. 
Public policy concerning cooperatives generally has been supportive because 
of the notion that cooperatives are procompetitive forces that improve the perfor-
mance of markets and increase general economic welfare.  In the case of a single 
processor, a cooperative that maximizes member returns may process a greater 
level of output than if it were a profit-maximizing IOF.  On the other hand, a co-
operative that maximizes quantity may process more than a competitive market or 
what is socially desirable.  Similar conclusions can be drawn for farm supply co-
operatives. 
An important dimension of the economic performance of cooperatives con-
cerns the effects they can be expected to have on other firms in imperfect markets.  
According to the competitive yardstick concept, the presence of a cooperative in a 
market will force profit-maximizing firms to behave more competitively by offer-
ing farmers more favorable prices to avoid losing customers.  It has been argued 
that the existence of the yardstick effect depends on the cooperative’s member-
ship policy because only an open-membership cooperative can be expected to ex-
ert a positive effect on competition.  However, economic models have demon-
strated that a cooperative that maximizes member returns can result in greater in-
dustry output and economic welfare as well. 
  
Jeffrey S. Royer 33 
 
 
Mathematical Appendix 
Here mathematical models of a farm supply firm and a processing firm are 
presented to support the descriptive and graphical analyses.  Price and output so-
lutions are derived for the IOF objective of maximizing profit and the cooperative 
objective of maximizing member returns.  Solutions also are derived for coopera-
tives that handle whatever quantity of products members choose to purchase or 
deliver.  Those solutions are then compared to the solutions for the maximization 
of economic welfare to determine the conditions under which profit-maximizing 
firms and cooperatives are efficient in an allocative sense. 
A Model of a Farm Supply Firm 
Assume that agricultural producers employ two inputs in the production of a 
single product according to the following production function: 
 
 ( , )q q x y  (1) 
 
where q is the quantity of the product and x and y represent the levels of the two 
inputs.11  Producer profits can be represented as 
 
 ( , ) x yp q x y r x r y        (2) 
 
where p is the price producers receive for the product and xr  and yr  are the prices 
they pay for inputs x and y.12  Producers maximize profits according to the follow-
ing first-order conditions: 
 
 0x
q
p r
x x
 
  
 
 (3) 
 
and 
 
 0y
q
p r
y y
 
  
 
 (4) 
                                                 
11 The purpose of assuming two inputs is to demonstrate that the demand for each input is a func-
tion of the price of the other input, as well as its own price and the price of the output.  This model 
could easily be generalized to n inputs. 
 
12 To keep the notation as simple as possible, we will not employ subscripts for individual agricul-
tural producers. 
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where the terms ( )p q x   and ( )p q y   represent the marginal value products 
of x and y.  To maximize profits, producers will employ each input at the level 
where its marginal value product is equal to its price. 
Solving equations (3) and (4) simultaneously for x and y and summing over all 
producers yields the input demand functions: 
 
 ( , , )x yx x r r p  (5) 
 
and 
 
 ( , , ).x yy y r r p  (6) 
 
The demand for each input is a function of the prices of both inputs and the out-
put.13 
Now consider a farm supply firm that specializes in the production of input x.  
Its profit can be defined as 
 
 ( ) ( )xr x x c x     (7) 
                                                 
13 For example, consider the production function 
 
q Ax y   
 
where α, β > 0 and α + β < 1.  Substituting this function into equation (2) for q, we can derive the 
following first-order conditions: 
 
1 0xp Ax y r
x
   

  

 
 
and 
 
1 0.yp Ax y r
y
   

  

 
 
Solving these conditions simultaneously for x and y, the input demand function for x is 
 
1
1 1
.
x y
x Ap
r r
  
 
     
           
 
 
From this, it is clear that the demand for x is a function of both input prices and the output price.
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where ( )xr x  is a convenient form for representing the inverse input demand func-
tion ( , , ),x x yr r x r p  which is determined by solving equation (5) for xr  in terms 
of x.  The term ( )c x  represents the total cost of producing x. 
If the input supplier is a profit-maximizing firm, its first-order condition is 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,x x
d
r x x r x c x
dx

        (8) 
 
which implies that the input supplier will maximize profit by producing x at the 
level where its marginal revenue from the sale of x is equal to the marginal cost of 
producing x,14 represented by the quantity 1x  in figure 13. 
Next consider a farm supply cooperative that maximizes member returns, in-
cluding its own earnings, which are returned to members as patronage refunds.  
Assume all producers are members.  Then the cooperative’s objective function 
can be written 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
x x y
y
r x x c x p q x y r x x r y
p q x y c x r y
         
    
  (9) 
 
                                                 
14 Here and throughout, it is assumed that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satis-
fied.  In this particular case, the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing input supplier can be 
rewritten 
 
0
d
MR MC
dx

    
 
where MR and MC respectively represent the firm’s marginal revenue and marginal cost.  Conse-
quently, the second-order condition for profit maximization can be written 
 
2
2
0
d dMR dMC
dx dxdx

    
 
or 
 
.
dMR dMC
dx dx
  
 
For a maximum, the slope of the marginal revenue curve must be less than the slope of the mar-
ginal cost curve, i.e., marginal cost must be increasing at a faster rate than marginal revenue. 
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Figure 13.  Price and output solutions for farm supply firms given a down-
ward-sloping demand curve 
 
where here π represents the sum of the profits of the individual producers in equa-
tion (2).  The corresponding first-order condition is 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0
d q
p c x
dx x


    

 (10) 
 
where ( )p q x   once again represents the marginal value product of x.  Thus the 
cooperative maximizes member returns by producing at the level where the mar-
ginal value product of x equals the marginal cost of producing x.  From equation 
(3), we know that producers will operate such that the marginal value product of x 
is equal to the price paid for x.  Thus 
 
 ( ) ( )xr x c x  (11) 
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is equivalent to the first-order in equation (10).  The cooperative will produce at 
the level where the marginal cost of producing the farm input is equal to its mar-
ket price, shown as 3x  in figure 13. 
In the case of a cooperative that produces whatever quantity of x producers 
choose to purchase,15 the receipt of patronage refunds provides producers an in-
centive to increase their purchases until the cooperative’s average cost of produc-
ing x is equal to the price of x and the cooperative breaks even.  Producers seek to 
maximize their profits: 
 
 ( , ) ( )x yp q x y r s x r y         (12) 
 
where s represents the per-unit patronage refund and xr s  is the net price pro-
ducers pay for the product.  Their first-order conditions are 
 
 ( ) 0x
q
p r s
x x
 
   
 
  (13) 
 
and 
 
 0.y
q
p r
y y
 
  
 
 (14) 
 
Solving equations (13) and (14) simultaneously for x and y and summing over all 
producers yields the input demand functions: 
 
 ( , , )x yx x r s r p   (15) 
 
and 
 
 ( , , ).x yy y r s r p   (16) 
 
Solving equation (15) for xr s  in terms of x, we obtain the input demand func-
tion for x in its inverse form: 
 
                                                 
15 This assumption is equivalent to assuming the cooperative maximizes the quantity of x it pro-
duces.  Similarly, assuming a processing cooperative processes whatever quantity of raw product 
producers choose to deliver is equivalent to assuming it maximizes the quantity processed. 
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 ( , , ).x x yr s R x r p   (17) 
 
The per-unit patronage refund s is equal to the cooperative’s net earnings di-
vided by the quantity of the farm input x it produces: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .
x
x
r x x c x
s
x
r x c x x
 

 
 (18) 
 
Substituting equation (18) for s in equation (17), we obtain the equilibrium condi-
tion for the cooperative: 
 
 ( ) ( ) .xr x s c x x   (19) 
 
Equilibrium occurs where the net price of the farm input equals the average cost 
of producing it.  For any particular net price, the values of xr  and s are not unique.  
Therefore, it is convenient to assume that the cooperative sets the cash price for 
the farm input equal to its average cost so that ( ) ( )xr x c x x  and 0.s    Substi-
tuting 0s   into equation (19), the equilibrium condition can be expressed in a 
simpler form without loss of meaning: 
 
 ( ) ( ) .xr x c x x  (20) 
 
Equilibrium occurs where the price of the input x equals its average cost, repre-
sented by the quantity 4x  in figure 13. 
A Model of a Processing Firm16 
Assume producers produce a single raw product that is sold to a processor.  
Producers seek to maximize their profits: 
 
 ( )r q f q     (21) 
 
                                                 
16 The models of a processing cooperative and the maximization of economic welfare are based on 
similar models presented in Royer (2001).  As before, the processor model can be applied to a 
cooperative that simply markets the raw product by considering the processing costs as represent-
ing the costs of transporting or marketing the product. 
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where r is the raw product price paid producers by the processor, q is the quantity 
of raw product produced, and ( )f q  is the total cost of producing the raw product.  
Profit maximization occurs where the marginal cost of producing the raw product 
equals the raw product price: 
 
 ( ) 0.
d
r f q
dq

    (22) 
 
Solving equation (22) for r and summing over all producers yields the raw prod-
uct inverse supply function ( ).r f q  
For convenience and without loss of generality, we can assume that a unit of 
processed product is equal to a unit of raw product.  Then the processor’s profit 
function can be written 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )p q q k q r q q       (23) 
 
where ( )p q  is the processed product price and ( )k q  represents total processing 
cost exclusive of the cost of the raw product.  Here the raw product price is writ-
ten as ( )r q  to reflect the processor’s monopsony power in the raw product mar-
ket.  Substituting the raw product inverse supply function for ( )r q  in equation 
(23) and differentiating it with respect to quantity, the first-order condition for a 
profit-maximizing processor is 
 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
d
p q q p q k q f q q f q
dq

            (24) 
 
According to equation (24), a processor maximizes its profit by setting its mar-
ginal revenue in the processed product market equal to the sum of its marginal 
processing cost and the marginal factor cost of the raw product (MFC).  The first 
two terms on the right, marginal revenue less the marginal processing cost, are 
equivalent to the net marginal revenue product (NMRP).  Thus the output of the 
profit-maximizing processor is 1q  in figure 14, determined by the intersection of 
the NMRP and MFC curves. 
Now consider a cooperative processor that maximizes member returns, includ-
ing its own earnings, which are returned to members as patronage refunds.  As-
sume all producers are members.  Then the cooperative’s objective function can 
be written 
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Figure 14.  Price and output solutions for processing firms 
 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )p q q k q f q      (25) 
 
where here π represents the sum of the profits of the individual producers in equa-
tion (21).  The corresponding first-order condition is 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
d
p q q p q k q f q
dq
            (26) 
 
The cooperative maximizes member returns by setting its marginal revenue in the 
processed product market equal to the sum of its marginal processing cost and the 
marginal cost of producing the raw product.  The first two terms on the right are 
once again equivalent to NMRP.  In addition, the last term is equivalent to the raw 
product supply curve according to equation (22).  Thus the optimal level of output 
is 3q  in figure 14, determined by the intersection of the NMRP curve and the raw 
product supply curve S. 
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In the case of a cooperative that processes whatever quantity of raw product 
producers choose to deliver, the receipt of patronage refunds provides producers 
an incentive to expand output until the cooperative’s net average revenue product 
(NARP) is equal to the raw product price and the cooperative breaks even, as in 
the Helmberger-Hoos model.  Producers seek to maximize their profits: 
 
 ( ) ( )r s q f q      (27) 
 
where s represents the per-unit patronage refund.  The first-order condition is 
 
 ( ) 0.
d
r s f q
dq

     (28) 
 
The per-unit patronage refund is equal to the cooperative’s net earnings divided 
by the quantity of raw product processed: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).
p q q k q r q q
s
q
p q k q q r q
   

  
 (29) 
 
Substituting equation (29) for s in equation (28), we obtain the equilibrium condi-
tion: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.p q k q q f q    (30) 
 
Equilibrium occurs where the processed product price less the average processing 
cost equals the marginal cost of producing the raw product.  The first two terms 
are equivalent to NARP.  Thus the output of a cooperative that processes whatever 
quantity members choose to deliver is determined by the intersection of the NARP 
and raw product supply curves, represented by the quantity 4q  in figure 14. 
Maximization of Economic Welfare 
Resources used in the production of a good are allocated efficiently if they are 
employed in such a manner that the economic welfare associated with its produc-
tion and consumption is maximized.  In the model of a farm supply firm, econom-
ic welfare consists of consumer surplus at the farm level: 
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*
* *
0
( )
x
f x xCS r x dx r x    (31) 
 
plus producer surplus at the supplier level: 
 
 
*
* *
0
( )
x
s xPS r x c x dx     (32) 
 
where *x  and *xr  are the quantity and price solutions for x.  Summing equations 
(31) and (32), economic welfare can be written 
 
  
*
0
( ) ( ) .
x
xW r x c x dx   (33) 
 
Setting the first derivative to zero: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0.x
dW
r x c x
dx
    (34) 
 
Economic welfare is maximized at the level where the farm input price equals the 
marginal cost of producing the input, a well-known result, which is represented by 
the quantity 3x  in figure 13. 
The first-order and equilibrium conditions for the various farm supply firms 
are compared to the welfare-maximizing condition in table 3.  The first-order 
condition for a profit-maximizing firm differs from the welfare-maximizing con-
dition in that it contains ( ) ( ),x xr x x r x   or marginal revenue, in place of ( ),xr x  
the farm input price.  If the firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve,  
( ) 0.xx r x    As a result, the marginal revenue curve will lie beneath the demand 
curve, and the firm will restrict its output to less than the welfare-maximizing lev-
el.  Only if ( ) 0,xr x   i.e., the firm is a price taker, will the firm’s production meet 
the criterion for allocative efficiency. 
The first-order condition for a farm supply cooperative that maximizes mem-
ber returns is identical to the welfare-maximizing condition.  The cooperative 
produces the optimal level of the farm input and uses resources efficiently.  Ex-
amination of equation (20) reveals that this generally is not the case for a coopera- 
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Table 3.  Comparison of the output solutions for farm supply firms to the 
welfare-maximizing condition 
 
tive that produces whatever quantity of the farm input members choose to pur-
chase.  The equilibrium condition contains ( ) ,c x x  the average cost of producing 
the input, in place of ( ),c x  the marginal cost.  If ( ) ( ) ,c x c x x   the cooperative 
will overproduce x relative to the welfare-maximizing quantity because the mar-
ginal cost of producing x will exceed its value in producing the farm product q as 
reflected by its market price ( ).xr x   The efficient level of x will be produced only 
if ( ) ( ) ,c x c x x   as at the minimum of the ATC curve in figure 13 or under a cost 
structure characterized by constant marginal costs.  
In the model of a processing firm, economic welfare consists of consumer 
surplus in the processed product market: 
 
 
*
* *
0
( )
q
CS p q dq p q    (35) 
 
plus producer surplus at the processor level: 
 
 
*
* * * *
0
( )
q
pPS p q k q dq r q      (36) 
 
and producer surplus at the farm level: 
 
Objective Condition Equation 
Maximization of economic 
welfare 
( ) ( )xr x c x  (34) 
Maximization of profit ( ) ( ) ( )x xr x x r x c x     (8) 
Maximization of member 
returns (including patron-
age refunds) 
( ) ( )xr x c x  (11) 
Production of quantity 
demanded by members 
( ) ( )xr x c x x  (20) 
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Table 4.  Comparison of the output solutions for processing firms to the wel-
fare-maximizing condition 
 
 
 
*
* *
0
( )
q
fPS r q f q dq     (37) 
 
where 
*q  is the quantity solution and *p  and *r  are respectively the processed 
and raw product price solutions.  Summing equations (35), (36), and (37), eco-
nomic welfare can be written 
 
  
*
0
( ) ( ) ( ) .
q
W p q k q f q dq     (38) 
 
Setting the derivative to zero: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
dW
p q k q f q
dq
      (39) 
 
Economic welfare is maximized at the level where the processed product price 
equals the sum of the marginal processing cost and the marginal cost of producing 
the raw product, represented by the quantity 
*q  in figure 14. 
The first-order and equilibrium conditions for the various processing firms are 
compared to the corresponding welfare-maximizing condition in table 4.  The 
Objective Condition Equation 
Maximization of economic 
welfare 
( ) ( ) ( )p q k q f q    (39) 
Maximization of profit ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p q q p q k q f q q f q          (24) 
Maximization of member 
returns (including patron-
age refunds) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p q q p q k q f q       (26) 
Production of quantity 
supplied by members 
( ) ( ) ( )p q k q q f q   (30) 
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first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm differs from the welfare-
maximizing condition in that it contains ( ) ( ),p q q p q   or marginal revenue in 
the processed product market, in place of ( ),p q  the processed product price, and 
it contains ( ) ( ),f q q f q    the marginal factor cost of the raw product, in place 
of ( ),f q  which is equivalent to the raw product price given equation (22).  Thus 
a profit-maximizing firm will restrict output to a level less than the efficient level 
either if ( ) 0,p q   i.e., the firm faces a downward-sloping processed product de-
mand curve, or if ( ) 0,f q   i.e., the firm faces an upward-sloping raw product 
supply curve.  The firm will produce the efficient level of output only if ( ) 0p q   
and ( ) 0,f q   i.e., the firm is a price taker in both the raw and processed product 
markets. 
The first-order condition for a cooperative that maximizes member returns dif-
fers from the welfare-maximizing condition only in that it contains 
( ) ( )p q q p q   in place of ( ).p q   Thus the cooperative will restrict output to less 
than the efficient level if ( ) 0.p q    If ( ) 0,p q   the two conditions are identical. 
The equilibrium condition for a cooperative that processes whatever quantity 
of raw product members choose to deliver differs from the welfare-maximizing 
condition in that it contains ( ) ,k q q  the average processing cost, in place of 
( ),k q  the marginal processing cost.  If ( ) ( ) ,k q k q q   the cooperative will 
overproduce q relative to the welfare-maximizing quantity because the sum of the 
marginal costs of producing and processing q will exceed its value to consumers 
as reflected by its price in the processed product market.  The cooperative will 
produce the efficient level of output only if ( ) ( ) ,k q k q q   as at the minimum of 
the average processing cost curve or under a cost structure characterized by con-
stant marginal costs. 
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